One is not enough! by Bergeijk, P.A.G. (Peter) van
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
No. 521 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk 
 
 
 
April 2011 
 
 
 
 
One is not enough! 
Understanding world trade collapses 
 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0921-0210 
 
The Institute of Social Studies is Europe’s longest-established centre of higher education and 
research in development studies. On 1 July 2009, it became a University Institute of the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam (EUR). Post-graduate teaching programmes range from six-week diploma 
courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the sense of laying a scientific 
basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of ISS is 
disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and working 
papers. The Working Paper series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks to elicit 
comments and generate discussion. The series includes academic research by staff, PhD 
participants and visiting fellows, and award-winning research papers by graduate students. 
Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.iss.nl 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
Institute of Social Studies 
P.O. Box 29776 
2502 LT The Hague 
The Netherlands  
or  
E-mail: wpapers@iss.nl 
 3
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT  4 
1 INTRODUCTION 5 
2 WORLD TRADE COLLAPSES 7 
2.1 The drivers of trade collapse 8 
2.2 Country specific factors 10 
2.3 Consequences – not causes: protectionism and trade credit 12 
2.4 A priori expectations 13 
3 MEASUREMENT 14 
3.1 Volume of imports 15 
3.2 Real GDP (per cent decline and pre-crisis per capita level) 17 
3.3 Manufacturing import share 18 
3.4 Political variables 19 
3.5 Country size (shares in world population, world production and 
world trade) and openness 19 
3.6 Comparability between periods 19 
3.7 Bivariate correlates of import collapse 21 
4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND ECONOMETRIC FINDINGS 27 
4.1 Research design 27 
4.2 Econometric findings 28 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis and robustness of the findings 31 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 32 
REFERENCES  34 
APPENDIX - DATASET 36 
 
 4
Abstract 
In order to put the mainstream narrative for the recent world trade collapse 
into a consistent economic-historic framework, this paper builds a comparable 
data set for the analysis of world trade collapses consisting of 72 periods of 
import decline (27 in the 1930s; 45 in 2008-10). The empirical analysis explains 
about three quarters of cross-country variance and supports the emerging 
professional consensus that identifies the decrease in domestic demand and the 
share of manufacturing trade as key determinants of the severity of a world 
trade collapse, but the paper also reveals significant differences between the 
1930s and the 2000s. Both the demand shock and the composition effect are 
comparatively speaking less important in the recent trade collapse. The paper 
identifies country-specific determinants (level of development, political system 
and openness) that have not (yet) been considered in the mainstream narrative 
for the recent world trade collapse. In line with the theory of trade uncertainty 
(van Marrewijk and van Bergeijk 1993, van Bergeijk 2010), I find that more 
democratic, more open, and wealthier countries reduced their imports to a 
smaller extent. 
 
Keywords 
World trade collapse, deglobalization, economic history, value chains, 1930s, 
2008-2010. 
 5
One is not enough!1  
Understanding world trade collapses 
1 Introduction 
... the same combination of factors (financial constraints coupled with a demand 
slump) have been central to the great trade collapse (Iacovane and Zavacka, 2009). 
Trade with virtually all parts in the world decreased by a similar order of magnitude 
(Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar, 2010). 
We do not yet have all the facts, but the two leading explanations of the sharp 
contraction in trade are the widespread use of international supply chains, and the 
drying up of short-term trade credit. (Baldwin and Evenett 2009). 
The extent of the sharp contraction in global trade in 2008–09 is mainly attributable 
to compositional effects, global supply chains, and reduced availability of trade 
finance and credit (Gregory, Henn, McDonald and Saito, 2010). 
The world trade collapse that started in October 2008 and reduced global trade 
by some twenty per cent in only a few months time remains one of the most 
puzzling economic phenomena of the last decade. In mid-2009 a consensus 
amongst trade economists emerged: the recent world trade collapse was 
essentially a demand shock multiplied by a composition effect (the 2009 edited 
volume by Richard Baldwin is an example). The other dominant view in the 
profession (of which the WTO in 2009 is a clear example) extends this 
narrative by other factors, sometimes using different wording. It argues that 
the trade collapse was caused by protectionism, lacking trade finance and a 
demand shock that was enlarged by the fragmentation of production in 
international value chains (the latter, incidentally, is also seen to be a driver of 
composition effects). 
The main problem with either representation of the consensus is that the 
underlying analysis is based on empirical analyses of post Second World War 
data only.2 Economists typically do not include the Black Swan of the 1930s in 
their analysis. They compare the usual fluctuations in international trade (as 
observed in the post second world war period) to the exceptional trade 
collapse in 2008-9. This would seem to be simply inappropriate for the analysis 
of the phenomenon of world trade collapse essentially because this 
phenomenon is thus implicitly treated as a unique event and actually  
‘such events can only be explained historically as they defy the laws of 
economics’ (Rothermund 1996, p. 1).3 
                                                 
1 Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at the European Trade Study 
Group (Lausanne September 10, 2010) and the Peterson Institute (November 29, 
2010). Comments by Jan-Luiten van Zanden and participants of both meetings are 
gratefully acknowledged. 
2 A notable exception is Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2009. 
3 Rothermund is of course referring to the 1930s. 
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The literature that deals with the trade collapse in the 1930s has also generally 
speaking not taken earlier episodes of declining global trade volumes into 
account. The literature in the past of course could not (yet) consider the trade 
collapse of the 2000s, but even so a detailed analysis of earlier episodes is not 
available (one obvious reason is that the collection of comparable data on 
international trade started in the 1910s and the available multi-country sources 
do not cover years prior to 1913; see Loveday 1921). In addressing this 
methodological problem I study the drivers of import collapses in the wane of 
two world trade collapses. The econometric analysis explores the substantial 
amount of cross-country variations in the decline of nations’ import volumes. 
This procedure provides a sufficient number of observations as the data set 
covers 27 economies in the 1930s and 45 economies in the 2000s. For these 72 
cases a set of relevant variables was identified for which reliable and 
comparable data could be collected.4 (Note, however, that the country 
coverage is not complete for all explanatory variables.)  
The main contribution of this paper is thus that it analyses two world 
trade collapses (that of the 1930s and that of the 2000s) in a consistent 
framework. Since I want to cover two periods in time that are very distinct, I 
do not have much choice of comparable data and thus use a simple 
parsimonious model that uses essentially seven variables. I relate the depth of 
import collapse of individual countries (peak to trough) first of all to the two 
forces that play the main role in the emerging mainstream consensus: the 
demand shock (the peak to trough movement in their GDP) and the share of 
manufactures in their international trade flow. These variables have been 
collected from different sources as detailed in Section 2 of the paper. To this 
‘core’ I add a number of country-specific variables for which data have been 
reported that where constructed using a consistent framework so that their 
comparability over time is much less problematic. In particular I use the 
development level (proxied by per capita GDP), the political system and a set 
of variables that controls for country size and openness. The findings support 
the emerging professional consensus where that identifies the decrease in 
domestic demand and the share of manufacturing trade as key determinants of 
the severity of a world trade collapse. However, as will become clear, the 
demand shock and the composition effect are comparatively speaking less 
important in the recent trade collapse than in the 1930s. Note, however, that 
my point is not that these factors would not matter in a comparison of the 
world trade collapse in the 2000s with the usual fluctuations in international 
trade. My point is simply that the applicability of the narrative is better for the 
1930s. In addition I find that institutional factors are important for both 
periods (this is a factor that is completely lacking in the mainstream narrative). 
In particular I find that the decline of imports is stronger in centralized 
autocratic economies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section 
introduces and discusses some aspects of the trade collapse and the main 
                                                 
4 The requirement of reliability and comparability of the data has an important 
implication as I thereforedo not include China in the analysis of the recent trade 
collapse. 
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narrative in order to motivate the selection of explanatory variables that will 
later be used in a quasi-postulated reduced form equation. Section 2 is devoted 
to measurement. I discuss content and reliability of sources and additional 
calculations that were necessary to construct my database (the full dataset is 
reproduced in the Appendix). The data are presented graphically offering 
partial analyses of import decline vis-à-vis GDP decline, manufacturing trade, 
per capita GDP and indicators for the political system, country size and 
openness. Section 3 provides the detailed multivariate regression analysis that 
tests inter alia for differences in the impact of the variables in the 1930s viz. the 
2000s. The final section draws conclusions and discusses some implications. 
2 World trade collapses 
The phenomenon that is studied in this paper is the collapse of world trade – 
that is: an event of negative real growth of international trade that occurs both 
in the aggregate for world trade and in almost all countries for their individual 
imports and/or exports. World trade collapses are relatively unique: in the 
period 1880-2010 only about 12 per cent of the real annual growth rates were 
negative and the overall trend with the exception of the 1930s has been 
positive. In the period 1951-2008 in less than seven per cent of the years a 
negative real annual growth rate for world trade was registered (namely in 
1958, 1972, 1980 and 1982).5  
The study of world trade collapse has merit on its own account. It is also 
highly relevant from a policy perspective since the concurrence of declining 
imports in a great many countries during the two world trade collapses implies 
a reduction of global import demand so that an export led recovery (that is: the 
‘usual policy recipe’ to grow out of a financial crisis6) is difficult to conceive for 
individual countries (and for the world as a whole for that matter). Moreover, a 
better understanding of the causes of the world trade collapse and its impact is 
relevant both for science because this unique “real world experiment” provides 
a useful (yet extreme) testing ground for theories and for policy as this could 
provide the information that is necessary for the design of institutions that can 
prevent or reduce of this manner of disruption.  
Figure 1 illustrates that the recent world trade collapse hit both emerging 
economies and the advanced countries showing the differences in the pattern 
(timing, speed, extent) of collapse and (partial) recovery. Indeed, one of the 
eye-catching aspects of the world collapses is the quite different impact on 
individual countries (Tanaka 2009, Levchenko et al. 2010). So while trade fell 
everywhere, the extent to which it fell showed a lot of variation and these 
differences may provide clues about the determinants of trade collapse. 
                                                 
5 Van Bergeijk (2010, pp. 6-12) provides a detailed discussion also of some data series 
with different periodicity and/or level of aggregation. 
6 An example is IMF (2009, p. 112): ‘one key factor that helped economies recover 
from a recession associated with a financial crisis was the fact that they were able to 
benefit from strong external demand. This suggests that disruptions to the supply of 
credit may not matter much for firms that are highly dependent on outside funding if 
they produce goods that are highly tradable.’ 
 8
FIGURE 1 
 The world trade collapse in the 2000s (index numbers world import volume 2000=100) 
Source: CPB World Trade Monitor (www.cpb.nl) accessed Jan. 24, 2011 
Consider Figure 2a that illustrates that imports in the 1930s fell by an 
astonishing eighty per cent in Chile and by a comparatively modest ten per 
cent in the United Kingdom and Japan. The peak to trough movement in 
2008-2009 (Figure 2b) varied between more than forty per cent in Iceland, 
Bulgaria, Thailand, Venezuela and Argentina to some ten per cent in 
Switzerland and the Netherlands. It is this heterogeneity in country experiences 
that this paper explores. Essentially I treat these observations as an 
unstructured panel (and accordingly, I use appropriate time dummies later on 
in the econometric analysis). 
2.1 The drivers of trade collapse  
The scientific narratives for the 1930s and 2000s produced a long list of factors 
that were shown or assumed to have caused or aggravated the world trade 
collapse (see Estevadoreal 2003, Freund 2009, Baldwin and Evenett 2009, 
WTO 2009). These narratives agree on two key drivers that will also be the 
variables of special interest in this working paper: a demand shock and a 
composition effect.  
First of all the most important driver of the collapse of trade is seen to be 
the reduction in Gross Domestic Product (representing macroeconomic 
demand). Typically and for many reasons the change in trade is expected to be 
a multiple of the change in GDP (Baldwin 2009, Freund 2009, WTO 2009). 
First, the share of services in GDP is much larger than in international trade 
and services are less volatile than goods. Second, the share of consumer goods 
and investment in trade is much larger. This is relevant because a demand 
reduction will in general be especially felt in these products: 
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The compositional effect turns on the peculiar nature of the demand shock. The 
demand shock was very large, but also focused on a narrow range of domestic 
value-added activities – the production of ‘postponeable’ goods, consumer 
durables and investment goods. This demand drops immediately, reducing 
demand for all related intermediate inputs (parts and components, chemicals, 
steel, etc). The compositional-effect argument is founded on the fact that 
postponeables make up a narrow slice of world GDP, but a very large slice of the 
world trade (Baldwin 2009, p. 7).  
FIGURE 2 
 a) Heterogeneity of import decline in the 1930s (peak to through decline in per cent  
1928-1937)  
 
 
 
 
 
b) Heterogeneity of import decline in the 2000s (peak to through decline in per cent 
2008Q1-2009Q4) 
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Third, trade relates to turnover and GDP is based on value added. A turnover 
number typically is a multiple of a value added number (but the rate of change 
of course is not). Fourth, in as far as industrial trade consists of international 
composites it is relevant that products in different stages of production may 
cross borders many times and international trade will thus be double counted 
every time that a (component of a) product moves from one country to 
another.  
Yet another aspect of manufacturing trade is the international division of 
labour, in particular the organization of production in international value 
chains. In particular regarding the recent trade collapse it was argued from the 
start that the existence of a network of international value chains could explain 
both the propagation of shocks (and thus the simultaneity of the trade collapse 
in many countries) and the severity of the trade shock (the fact that the 
percentage reduction of trade was a manifold of the percentage reduction in 
GDP). This value chain argument mainly rests on the observation that the 
share of intermediate products in international trade and the elasticity of world 
trade to GDP increased significantly over recent decades. Therefore observers 
such as Freund (2009) and Cheun and Guichard (2009) have assumed a causal 
relationship between the two. Fragmentation of production is thus seen as a 
driver of the world trade collapse. 
Potentially counterbalancing effects however are also likely. Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2009) relate the overshooting of trade to omitted variables. Van 
Marrewijk (2009) finds in his equations for the decline and steepness of the 
trade collapse that a little bit more than half the coefficients for intra-industry 
trade are negative and significant at the usual confidence level of 90 per cent 
and better and speculates that this is because value chains spread the trade 
shocks over many countries providing a cushion. Other examples of such 
effects would be the larger trust among repeat buyers and the use of non-bank-
intermediated trade credit (van Bergeijk 2010). The upshot is that the direction 
of the impact of global value chains on trade during a global crisis is not a 
priori clear and essentially an empirical matter. Empirical studies that analyze 
the relationship between value chain activities on the one hand and world trade 
and/or openness on the other hand are, however, contradictory (see for a 
critical review Van Bergeijk 2010). These studies use quite different approaches 
including partial analyses (such as Tanaka 2009 and van Marrewijk 2009), single 
country analyses (such as Levchenko et al. 2009 and Robertson 2009) and 
calibrated simulation models (for example, Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2009 and 
Bems et al. 2010) and methodological differences may thus explain 
contradictions. It is, however also quite possible that the contradictory effects 
are due to the fact that counteracting forces are at play. One contribution of 
this paper is that it provides a multi-country perspective and the first test of 
this hypothesis in a cross-country setting for the 1930s and the 2008-9 trade 
collapse and for the full sample of the two trade collapses. 
2.2 Country specific factors  
Given the focus in most analyses on the development of world trade in a time 
series perspective, it is quite understandable that the previous literature has not 
paid a lot of attention to country-specific factors. Since the present paper deals 
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with cross-country variation it is important to take these factors on board. It 
will be sensible to control for a number of other country specific aspects that 
could explain the variation in import decline.  
Level of development (per capita GDP) 
A first important aspect is the level of development as already illustrated by 
different patterns of the trade cycle in Figure 1 for the advanced economies 
and the emerging markets. On the one hand one might expect that trade at low 
levels of development trade consists of essential goods with low elasticity so 
that reductions of imports would be comparatively speaking limited. On the 
other hand, financial leeway is often limited for developing countries so that 
they have to act more quickly and reduce imports if the prospects for export 
turn sour.  All in all it is important to include per capita GDP as a control 
variable.  
Political institutions 
Democratic countries tend to have more liberal trade policies (Milner and 
Kubota (2005), which may reflect the voting power of labour in a democracy 
(O’Rourke 2006) but could possibly also reflect that ‘trade is less threatening to 
individuals who have confidence in their country’s political institutions’ (Mayda 
and Rodrik 2005, p.  1410). Several authors have pointed out that autocratic, 
centrally-planned economies, due to their centralized decision-making 
processes, will respond quicker and sharper to (potential) trade problems. Van 
Marrewijk and van Bergeijk (1990 and 1993) point out a coordination failure in 
decentralized economies. Aidt and Gassebner (2007) develop an argument in 
which the possibility of a dictatorial ruler to extract rents by imposing trade 
distortions is the driving mechanism (and additionally they argue that control 
and monitoring of trade policies are less well developed in autocracies). 
Discussing the choice of instrumental variables in their study on the drivers 
behind the tariff escalation in the 1930s, Eichengreen and Irwin (2009, p. 26 
footnote 39) note: 
One might plausibly think that countries with authoritarian political regimes 
would be more likely to resort to exchange controls; restrictions on political 
freedom tended to go together in this as in other periods 
Country size and openness 
A third important aspect is the size of a country. Typically large countries with 
monopsonistic market power could improve the terms of trade by reducing 
their demand on the world market. Also large countries generally speaking 
have more and better opportunities for substitution and be thus better able to 
reduce their imports than small countries. One problem with country size is 
that it increases over time when population and production increase. 
Additionally, (market) power is a relative concept and typically a country would 
derive power from its share in the world economy. Country size is therefore 
defined as a share in global economic activity, in particular the shares in global 
population, production and trade are considered. 
Finally, openness matters. Open economies are more vulnerable to the 
reactions of other countries. But they also know and rely on the benefits of 
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international trade and will have specialized to a larger extent than more closed 
economies. Therefore they can be expected to be less inclined to reduce the 
volume of imports. The measure for openness is defined in relative terms by 
the ratio of the share in world trade to the share of world production. 
2.3 Consequences – not causes: protectionism and trade 
credit  
Protectionism and a sharp contraction of trade credit were ‘usual suspects’ in 
the initial phase when the speed and severity of the trade collapse became 
apparent (WTO 2009, Auboin 2009), but it appears more probable that 
increases in protectionism and reductions in trade-related finance are 
consequences rather than causes of world trade collapse. Regarding the 1930s 
there is wide agreement that the trade collapse was not sparked by an increase 
in protectionism, which Madsen (2001), Estevadeordal et al. (2003) and 
Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) all date around 1931−32 (so four years into the 
crisis). The 2008−09 world trade collapse took place at a moment in time when 
trade policies were generally speaking liberal. There is some evidence that 
protectionist pressures have been building up during 2009 and 2010, but not 
that protectionism played a role in the early phase of the trade collapse (van 
Bergeijk 2010, Gregory et al. 2010). All in all, the following quote from 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009, p. 10) would seem to neatly summarize the 
profession’s verdict on the role of protectionism before, during and following 
the onset of the trade collapse: 
Emerging protectionism is unlikely to have contributed to the collapse of world 
trade observed at the end of 2008, but it may have a sizeable impact in 2009 and 
2010, when the social consequences of the crisis in the real economy (...) will be 
felt and subsequent demands for protection can be expected. So far, it must be 
said that the monitoring process performed by the WTO seems to have kept 
such risks under tight control. 
Causality is also dubious in the case of trade-related finance, at least for 2008-
09.7 The mainstream analysis is that a reduction in the availability of finance 
and credit due to the problems in the banking sector triggered the trade 
collapse. This ignores that a reduction in trade will reduce the demand for 
trade finance and credit. The timing of events suggests that the causality runs 
from trade to finance since trade started to decline before trade credit did (Van 
Bergeijk 2010, pp. 62-70 and Niculcea et al 2011).8  
                                                 
7 Kindleberger (1978, p. 72) notes that lending on imports in 1929 ‘seems to have 
come to a complete stop’, but provides no further details. 
8 The trade finance argument often suffers from counterintuitive empirical problems. 
In the Cheung and Guicard (2009) global trade model that features a measure for 
financial tightness forecasting errors increase when the forecasting horizon decreases.  
Levchenko et al. find no evidence at the firm level that either exports or imports were 
reduced more strongly in sectors where trade credit is relatively important. They 
observe a contraction of trade credit at the firm level but more importantly median 
accounts receivable and payable are only one to two per cent lower than the peak level 
of 2007 while their simulations actually suggest a counterintuitive increase of imports 
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2.4 A priori expectations 
We can summarize the above discussion in a number of a priori expectations 
about the signs of the relationship between trade decline and the explanatory 
variables.  
GDP decline (demand shock) 
Effective demand will be reduced when national income decreases and thus 
imports follow the development of GDP. In addition to the sign of the 
relationship and the estimated coefficient, however, its size is also relevant and 
it will be useful to check if it exceeds the value of 1. Freund (2009) and WTO 
(2009) argue that the growing importance of international value chains results 
in a trade multiplier in excess of 1 (so that it magnifies fluctuations in income). 
O’Rourke (2009), however pointed the argument would require that marginal 
trade consists of relatively much vertically disintegrated production (and if not, 
the argument will actually work out in the opposite direction and yield a 
multiplier smaller than 1).9  
Manufacturing import share (composition effect) 
I use the share of manufactures before the start of the crisis to proxy the 
composition effect. Trade in manufactured goods would be especially 
vulnerable during trade collapses as these goods constitute the vast majority of 
the international composites. The test is direct for the ‘pure’ composition 
effect but can only act as an indirect test for the value chain hypothesis as this 
variable is a crude measures of the potential presence of value chains and does 
not reflect the intensity and extent of fragmentation per se.10 I expect a priori 
that a larger share of manufactured goods will be associated with a stronger 
import reduction. 
Country specific factors 
From the discussion above unambiguous expectations follow regarding Polity 
and Country size. A stronger import decline is expected a priori for both larger 
and less democratic countries. Regarding the level of development and 
openness expectations are ambiguous and thus essentially an open empirical 
question. 
                                                                                                                            
due to the somewhat lower level of trade finance. These ambiguities also indicate that 
the trade finance argument suffers from a causality problem. 
9 The trade multiplier has been analyzed using time series, but not yet in a cross-
section setting as in this paper. A cross-section perspective provides a tool to test for 
the relevance of O’Rourke’s caveat. 
10 In van Bergeijk (2010) I also use the share of vertical specialization in trade as an 
alternative measure which is of course more directly related to the issue at stake, but I 
can do so at an obvious cost only: the data are only available for the 2000s and even 
then the number of observations reduces from 45 to 34 countries when I use this 
explanatory variable. Van Marrewijk 2009 uses an alternative (but also indirect) 
measure – the Grubel-Lloyd index for intra-industry trade – to test the value chain 
argument for the 2008-09 trade collapse with comparable findings. 
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3 Measurement 
I use the standard apparatus for the analysis of business cycles to analyse the 
development of imports (and also for GDP). Figure 3 illustrates the standard 
methodology and the key measurement items regarding the trade collapse. 
FIGURE 3 
 Peak, trough, depth, duration, recovery and full recovery 
 
Notes: – Actual development of the volume of trade 
--- Trend development of the volume of trade in the absence of the trade collapse 
The trade cycle shows the usual cyclical pattern around an increasing trend (the 
dotted line). At some point in time the curve reaches its maximum (the peak) 
at which point the positive growth rate becomes negative. This is the start of 
the trade collapse. At the end of the trade collapse (the trough) the decline of 
the volume of trade ends and trade starts to grow again (although from a much 
lower level than its peak value). Note that a positive growth rate for the 
volume of trade does not imply that the status quo ante has been restored as that 
would require a substantial number of positive growth rates until the previous 
peak level has been reached again. This period is labelled ‘Recovery’. It could, 
however, be argued that full recovery may take even longer, namely until the 
trend level of world trade has been reached again (so exceeding the previous 
peak). Referring to Figure 1, recovery has not occurred for world trade, in 
particular due to the performance of the advanced economies, while full 
recovery has not yet occurred for the emerging economies. 
As the purpose of this paper is to analyze two events that are far apart in 
time, special consideration needs to be given to the fact that the data need to 
be reasonable comparable over a period of eighty years. Moreover, some 
Time 
Peak 
Trough 
Duration 
Recovery
Full recovery 
Volume of trade 
D
ep
th
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variables that may be relevant for the occurrence, depth and duration of world 
trade collapse may not be available. An example is trade credit for which the 
series has been discontinued just a few years before the trade collapse in 2008 
(Auboin 2009). It is also important to realize that measurement errors can be a 
serious problem in the present study. It is well known that many economic 
observations, in particular regarding the key variables of interest in the present 
study (volumes of imports and production) are often measured imprecise 
(Morgenstern 1950, Frederico and Tena 1991 and Van Bergeijk 1995). This is 
especially relevant because I use a blend of recent data that have not yet been 
revised and data from the 1930s that were collected with less advanced 
methods as compared to the recent data. As a practical way to reduce the 
extent of measurement error corruption I use aggregate trade data basically 
because this reduces misclassification by commodity and/or country. 
Moreover I use where possible sources that cover the full period or which have 
been constructed in the same ‘tradition’ of data collection and statistics 
production.11 
3.1 Volume of imports  
Throughout this paper I focus on the development of imports rather than on 
exports because import contractions can also be compared to individual 
financial crises (van Bergeijk 2009, 2010), essentially because the development 
of exports to a large extent is exogenous and – given the often mercantilist 
view of policy makers – may be sheltered from any negative consequences of 
the financial crisis. The impact of an individual financial crisis may thus be 
observed more accurately and directly when one studies the development of 
the volume of imports. During a global crisis (a world trade collapse) all 
countries experience contractions of their effective demand and thus global 
import demand contracts as well. In this case the short side rule applies: the 
size of world markets during a global crisis is not determined by supply but by 
demand, that is: world trade is determined by the imports of all countries.  
Trade volume data for the 1930s are not readily available for all countries. 
Two data sources provide the necessary data for the annual volume of imports 
of individual countries. My main source is a data set compiled by the UN 
Statistical Office (1962). The data set provides index numbers for the volume 
of trade, but not for all countries. It is also important to note that the official 
status of the data may be problematic. An accompanying note states: 
This publication is only available as a draft paper and it is indicated that “The 
data contained in the present paper should be regarded as preliminary, it is 
requested that no use be made of them until final publication.” Yet, the paper 
appears to be based on solid research and it is the best source for historical data 
available to us. Nevertheless this information is provided without assuming any 
responsibility for the accuracy of the data and only as a special service to 
                                                 
11 An example is the League of Nation data on the manufacturing share (1931) that as 
discussed in Section 2.3 are clearly related to the data in the UN (1962) draft paper 
that was published under the aegis of the UN division that is also responsible for the 
data source that I use for the manufacturing import share in 2008-09. 
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interested users which can use this data under their own responsibility and 
according to their own judgment.12  
The UN’s draft paper reports data on the volume of imports for: Australia 
(Table III), Austria (Table IV), Canada (Table VII), Chile (Table VIII), 
Denmark (Table IX), Finland (Table X), France (Table XI), Germany (Table 
XII), India (Table XIII), Italy (Table XIV), Japan (Table XV), the Netherlands 
(Table XVI), New Zealand (Table XVII), Norway (Table XVII), South Africa 
(Table XIX), Sweden (Table XX), Switzerland (Table XXI), the United 
Kingdom (Table XXII) and the United States (Table XXIII).  
The second data source for the 1930s is Maddison (1995, Tables A6 and 
A12, p. 87 and p. 90) who provides index numbers for real imports for 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Indonesia and Mexico. 
For the 2000s I also rely on two data sources. The main source is the 
OECDs National Accounts data base from which I use quarterly seasonally 
adjusted index number for the volume of imports for Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States.  
The second source is the IMFs International Financial Statistics (IFS). For 
Ecuador, Pakistan, Singapore and Thailand the IFS provides quarterly 
seasonally adjusted indices for the volume of imports that are comparable to 
the OECD quarterly National Accounts. For other countries no seasonal 
adjustment is available and here I use the reported National Accounts data that 
I deflated by the GDP deflator (Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Peru, Romania and South Africa) or the import wholesale price index 
(Venezuela).  
I date the peak and the trough in a fixed time frame, both for the 1930s 
where I use annual observations over 1929-1937 (I exclude 1938 and 1939 
since in these pre-war years data are suppressed and if available unreliable) and 
for the 2000s where I use quarterly data over the period 2008Q1-2009Q4.13 
Figure 4 illustrates the dating of the peak and trough for the case of the Irish 
import volume. The peak of the curve is in 2007, actually just before the 
breakout of the financial crisis, but the period of measurement is by design 
restricted to 2008Q1-2009Q4 (when the trade collapse actually occurred) and 
thus the peak is dated at 2008Q1 and the peak value is set accordingly. The 
figure also clarifies that fluctuations may temporarily pose as troughs until new 
data become available (like the local minimum in 2008Q2. However, given the 
                                                 
12 Source: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/imts/historical_data.htm, dated April 28, 
2009. 
13 For Chile 1930. 
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evolution in 2010 it seems reasonably save to work with the assumption that 
the trough is to be dated at 2009Q2.14 
FIGURE 4 
 Import volume Ireland 2007Q1-2010Q3 (index numbers) 
 
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts (www.oecd.org) accessed Jan. 24, 2011 
3.2 Real GDP (per cent decline and pre-crisis per capita 
level)  
For the peak to trough movement of real GDP in 2008-09 I use a comparable 
method (the dating of the peak and the trough is based on GDP data only and 
thus independent of the import volume ensuring the correct observation of the 
decline) and a comparable data set (based on OECD and IMF national 
accounts data) as for the dependent variable.15 For the 1930s I rely on 
Maddison’s historical series. This is the data set of Angus Maddison’s  Statistics 
on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD and an update from 
Maddison 2006. This source is also known as “Maddison’s historical series” 
and is available from the website of the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre www.ggdc.net. This source is also used for the pre-crisis level of GDP 
per capita (in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) in the 1930s and the 
2000s. The clear benefit of this procedure is that we have a consistent indicator 
for the level of development. Maddison is the only available source for 
internationally comparable per capita income that covers the countries for 
                                                 
14 It is, however, quite possible that data revisions may shift the dating of the Irish 
trough to 2009Q3 (here the difference is small). Data revisions are relatively frequent 
if seasonable adjustments are being made. The figure does, however, not indicate that 
it is likely that the import volume will fall below the 2009 trough again. 
15 No quarterly national accounts data are available from OECD or IMF for Ecuador, 
Pakistan and Venezuela. 
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which I was able to obtain the import volume indicators and for both periods. 
The level of per capita GDP is measured at the start of the trade collapse in 
1928 and 2008 respectively.16 
3.3 Manufacturing import share  
The manufacturing share is measured in the year before the start of the trade 
collapse, so in 1928 and 2008 and the shares are based on values reported in 
international sources.17  
For the inter bellum two sources are available; both sources are based on 
the work of the statistical office of the League of Nations, but there are 
differences in the reported numbers and the number of countries covered. The 
first data source is the draft report by the UN Statistical Office (1962) that was 
already introduced in Section 2.1 and that provides the value for manufactured 
goods and the value of the total of merchandise imports for 21 countries, so 
that their manufacturing import shares can be readily calculated.18 The second 
source to be considered is the League of Nations (1931, Table 95, pp.168-170) 
that reports percentage shares of trade by classes of commodities. The relevant 
class is Group IV “Manufactured Articles”. The League of Nations covers 18 
of the countries for which I have data on real import decline (see Section 2.1) 
and has an overlap with the UN draft report of 14 countries.19 The statistical 
relationship between the two sources for the overlapping countries is highly 
significant and almost all variance is explained by a very simple regression 
(which suggests that the sources differ by a constant factor related to a 
definitional or measurement issue):  
 
Manufacturing share = 0.88*Group IV + 9.2   R2=0.98, F=1074, N = 14    (1) 
 
Using this equation, four additional observations can be predicted for the 
manufacturing share of China, Cuba, Indonesia and Mexico so that for the 
1930s data are available for 25 countries. For Colombia and Formosa (Taiwan) 
none of the necessary data are available. The data for the manufacturing share 
of imports in the 2000s are straight-forward and measured as the share of the 
categories SITC 6, 7 and 8 in total imports (in per cent and for the year 2008) 
and derived from United Nations (2010). 
                                                 
16 For Cuba and China no data are available for 1928 so here the 1929 data where 
used. Maddison does not provide GDP for  South Africa in the inter bellum. 
17 For Cuba the year of observation is 1927, the last pre-crisis year for which a Group 
IV share has been published. 
18 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
19 Austria, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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3.4 Political variables  
The Polity IV dataset (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) is 
used to describe the political system of the economy, although some authors 
(for example Taylor and Wilson 2006) also use the Polity data as indicators for 
the quality of institutions. Polity IV contains operational indicators of 
institutionalized authority characteristics and annually codes nine democracy 
and autocracy sub-indicators. In this paper I use the so-called Polity2 indicator 
which is based on the aggregate score for Democracy and Autocracy and 
defined as Polity2 = Democracy – Autocracy.20 One problem with the Polity IV 
dataset is that it does not provide scores for colonies. This may be especially 
relevant since India and Indonesia were important trading nations in the 1930s. 
Several authors have encountered this problem and developed quite different 
ways to deal with it. Easterley (2005, p. 13), for example, uses the lowest 
democracy rating for the colonies in his sample and as an alternative runs 
regressions without colonies. I use a the third ad hoc solution and in order to 
investigate the sensitivity of the findings with respect to the exclusion of 
colonies in the 1930 I run regressions with and without this variable.21 
3.5 Country size (shares in world population, world 
production and world trade) and openness 
In order to classify countries by size using a measure that allows meaningful 
comparison between the 1930s and the 2000s, their shares in world population 
and world GDP were calculated for 1928 and 2008, respectively.22 The data are 
from the Maddison data set that was discussed in Section 2.2. Since I want to 
be able to differentiate countries by their importance as international trading 
nations, global trade shares were collected. These shares are directly reported in 
League of Nations (1931, Table 96, pp. 172-173) for the year 1928 and were 
calculated from the reported values in UN (2010, Table A) for the year 2008. 
Combining the trade and production shares, a relative and period-specific 
measure for openness was constructed as the ratio of a country’s share in 
world trade over its share in world production. The larger the ratio, the more 
important is international trade and specialization. 
3.6 Comparability between periods  
For pre crisis per capita GDP, pre crisis GDP (used as input for calculating the 
share in global production), population and polity the data are available from 
one source so that the consistency and the comparability are less problematic 
for these variables. In all other cases several sources had to be used and 
although the sources measure the same economic concept and sensible 
                                                 
20 Regressions based on either Democracy or Autocracy did not lead to qualitatively 
different conclusions. 
21 In addition as a check I also substituted a zero for the missing values, with no 
important qualitative differences in the findings. 
22 The data for China and Cuba refer to 1929, the earliest year in the inter bellum for 
which data are provided. 
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procedures were followed to arrive at comparable data still a number of 
potential problems should be flagged because they may be relevant for the 
interpretation of the findings in the next sections.  
Import volume changes have been taken from four sources and for one of 
the sources (the IMF’s International Financial Statistic) two additional 
procedures had to be used to arrive at real imports since the preferred variable 
(the seasonable adjusted volume of imports) was not reported on the 
respective country pages. For the 1930s annual data were used so that there is 
no need for a seasonable correction (note, however, that the time span is 
longer for the 1930s and that the peak to trough measure is less precise and 
indeed typically an underestimate, if annual data are used).  
For the change in GDP three data sources were used. For the 1930s I 
calculated peak to trough movement from the annual data reported in the 
Maddison data set that was discussed in Section 2.5. South Africa is the only 
country for which I do not have the change in GDP in the 1930s. Since the last 
year in this data set presently available is 2008, a different procedure was 
followed for the 2000s and peak to trough changes in per cent are calculated, 
first, from the OECD quarterly National Accounts and, second (if unavailable 
from the OECD), from the IMF International Financial Statistics. This 
procedure has at least the merit that import and GDP declines in the 2000s are 
based on exactly the same source for each individual country.  
The manufacturing share in imports was derived from three sources and 
although all sources are from the statistical office of the United Nations and its 
predecessor the League of Nations procedures, definitions, data collection and 
coverage have changed. The shares reported in the two League of Nations 
sources as discussed in section 2.3 differ by a constant factor and show a high 
correlation so that I am confident about the use of the League of Nation data, 
but the comparability with the data for 2008 can cause problems given that 
many revisions of product classification have occurred over the past 80 years. I 
do, however, not expect problems for the geographical pattern (so the share of 
a country’s trade in world trade) other than the usual measurement errors.  
So while a lot of effort was put in collecting and/or constructing 
comparable data, it is still important to note that differences are likely and 
finding therefore need to be interpreted with caution. Therefor the research 
strategy investigates patterns for the whole data set and also takes a look at 
separate correlates for the 1930s and 2008-09, respectively. This will be done 
with two distinct methodologies. Section 2.7 presents the data in a series of 
graphs where the data are reported for the 1930s and 2008-9 and in Section 3 
separate regressions are run for the full sample, the subsample of the 1930s 
and the subsample for 2008-09. This is a relevant approach because concepts 
are consistently measured in each separate period when uniform yet period-
specific definitions and measurement methods were used. The separate 
regressions for the periods can also provide relevant information about the 
general cross-period pattern, in particular when the signs and significance of 
the estimated coefficients between the full sample and the subsample findings 
are in agreement. Indeed, such agreement could be seen as additional evidence 
on the robustness of the findings. 
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3.7 Bivariate correlates of import collapse  
FIGURE 5 
 a) Import decline versus GDP decline 1930s 
  
 
b) Import decline versus GDP decline 2000s 
 
Note: significane levels: *90% **95% ***99% 
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FIGURE 6 
 a) Import decline versus manufacturing import share 1930s 
 
b) Import decline versus manufacturing share 2000s 
 
Note: significane levels: *90% **95% ***99% 
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FIGURE 7 
 a) Import decline versus pre-crisis polity 1930s 
 
b) Import decline versus pre-crisis polity 2000s 
 
Note: significane levels: *90% **95% ***99% 
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FIGURE 8 
 a) Import decline versus pre-crisis GDP p.c. 1930s 
 
b) Import decline versus pre-crisis GDP p.c. 2000s 
          
Note: significane levels: *90% **95% ***99% 
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FIGURE 9 
 a) Import decline versus openness 1930s 
 
 
 b) Import decline versus openness 2000s 
 
Note: significane levels: *90% **95% ***99% 
Figures 5 to 9 summarize the data in five scatter diagrams with the import 
collapse in per cent on the vertical axis and one of the explanatory variables on 
the horizontal axis (note that Appendix - Dataset provides the full data set). 
The graphs deal with GDP decline, manufacturing import share, pre-crisis 
Polity, pre-crisis per capita GDP and openness. The top panels of each figure 
show the data for the 1930s and the bottom panel for 2008-09. For ease of 
comparison, the scale of import decline (the vertical axis) is identical for all 
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figures. Horizontal axes are identical per explanatory variable (so for each top 
and bottom panel). Note that these figures use all data available for the 
respective explanatory variable. So for example for Figure 8 (trade decline 
versus openness) we have 72 observations available because there are no 
missing observations for openness. For other variables we have less than 72 
observations and for that reason the number of observations in the regressions 
never exceeds 66 (we have 6 missing values for the variables of special interest: 
4 for GDP decline and 2 for manufacturing trade share). The scatter diagrams 
suggest that the relationship between import decline and both GDP decline 
and the manufacturing share in trade was comparatively speaking stronger in 
the 1930s. In 2008-9 the effects of pre-crisis per capita GDP and openness are 
more pronounced. The effect of polity is quite comparable across period 
Table 1 reports the key statistics of the regression lines that appear in 
Figures 4 to 8. It is useful to compare the t-values between the 1930s and 
2008-09 since t-values are dimensionless variables and therefore less prone to 
measurement error and other time dependent distortions. Due to the differing 
amounts of available observations I use adj-R2 for inter-temporal and intra-
temporal comparisons. 
TABLE 1 
 Partial correlates and t-values 
 1930s 2008-09 
 N t-value  Adj-R2 N t-value  Adj-R2 
GDP decline 26 3.7*** 0.33 42 3.5*** 0.22 
Pre-crisis 
Manufacturing 
share 
25 2.9*** 0.27 45 0.7 -0.01 
Pre-crisis 
polity 
25 -2.7** 0.24 45 -2.2** 0.08 
Pre-crisis per 
capita GDP 
26 -1.3 0.03 45 -5.2*** 0.37 
Pre-crisis 
Openness 
26 -1.2 0.01 45 -2.8*** 0.13 
Notes: N number of available observations for explanatory variable. t value for the explanatory variable. 
Adj-R2 for equation that includes constant term as well *  90% ** 95% *** 99% significance levels 
The first thing to note is that the signs of the estimated slope coefficients 
correspond although the sizes and significance levels may differ. The 
significance levels for GDP decline and for pre-crisis polity show the same 
pattern (but note that the explanatory power of their partial correlates is 
substantially larger for the 1930s). Importantly the two trade collapses 
significantly appear to differ with respect to the manufacturing import share, 
per capita GDP and openness. 
 27
4 Research design and econometric findings 
The partial correlations that were reported in Section 2.7 provide already some 
relevant information about the determinants of the depth of the import decline 
in the 1930s versus the 2008-9 trade collapse. This section takes the 
determinants simultaneously on board and also investigates the larger sample 
properties of the data set. 
4.1 Research design 
The analysis takes the form of a cross-section analysis of percentage decrease 
of the volume of imports that occurred between 1928 and 1938 in 27 countries 
and between 2008Q1 and 2009Q4 in 45 countries. The decrease is measured 
peak to trough. The set of explanatory variables consist of a group of country-
specific variables (measured in the year before the world trade collapse started) 
and two variables for the demand shock and the composition effect. The 
research question aims at uncovering, first, a general relationship that describes 
the determinants of import collapse and, second, to test for differences 
between the two collapses (typically by running separate regressions including 
time specific dummy variables). I develop both a linear and a multiplicative 
(log-linear) set of regressions because I have no a priori information about the 
functional form and also to provide a test for the robustness of the findings. 
Unlike the country-specific variables for which data are available that have 
been derived from sources with long time horizons (that also include the 
periods in which I am interested), the observations for trade decline, demand 
shock (GDP decline) and composition effect (Manufacturing trade share) have 
been derived from period-specific sources. It is therefor important to note at 
the start that it is possible that the additive (shift) dummy for the 1930s may 
pick up the fact that the data are from sources that – although describing the 
same economic concepts (import, production, industry products) – have 
deployed different methods and procedures for data collection and definitions 
as discussed in Section 2. In view of the fact that imports and GDP are 
expressed as percentage changes and manufacturing share as a percentage, 
however, differences in data collection would probably result in a shift of the 
relationship (so where the dummy variable for the 1930s is additive). These 
differences would not have an impact on slope parameters (so where the 
dummy variable for the 1930s is entered multiplicatively).  
 
All in all a number of quasi-reduced form equations have been estimated that 
are based on the following specifications: 
(1) Import decline = αGDP decline+Manufacturing share + θPer capita GDP + 
ψPolity + λCountry size + Openness + ε                            (see Table 2) 
(2) Log(Import decline) = αLog(GDP decline)+ γLog(Manufacturing share + 
θLog(Per capita GDP + ψLog(Polity+) + λ Log(Country size )+ 
Log(Openness) + Constant term + ε                                   (see Table 3) 
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(3) Import decline = (α +δ1930s β)GDP decline+(γ +δ1930s ξ)Manufacturing share 
+ θPer capita GDP + ψPolity + λCountry size + Openness + δ1930s + Con-
stant term + ε                                                                    (see Table 4) 
with a priori expected  > 0, >0, <0 and >0. For the other variables 
expectations are ambiguous ( and ) or not formulated because the 
parameters will be positive or negative depending on significant differences 
between the 1930s and 2008-09. The dummy variable δ1930s  = 1 for the 1930s, 
else 0. In order to be able to take logs a constant  was added in equation 2 so 
that the Polity scale became strictly positive. The error term  has the usual 
properties. 
4.2 Econometric findings 
Tables 2 and 3 report the coefficients for the full sample and for the 1930s and 
2008-9. Table 2 reports on the linear specification of the empirical model 
(equation 1) and Table 3 reports the multiplicative version (equation 2). Tables 
2 and 3 are organized in the same way. The estimated coefficients in the linear 
model and the multiplicative model have a similar pattern in terms of signs and 
significance. Therefore the discussion does not deal with the tables separately.23  
TABLE 2 
 Determinants of import collapse 1930s and 2008-10 (Linear model, OLS, White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) 
Linear Full sample 1930s 2008-09 
Number of 
observations 
64 66 22 24 42 
GDP decline 0.6*** 
(3.1) 
0.7*** 
(3.6) 
0.8*** 
(5.2) 
1.0*** 
(7.1) 
0.2 
(1.4) 
Manufacturing 
import share 
0.3*** 
(2.8) 
0.3*** 
(2.7) 
0.4*** 
(3.0) 
0.4** 
(2.4) 
0.0 
(0.3) 
Pre crisis 
Polity 
-0.9** 
(2.6) 
 
 
-1.1 
(-1.6) 
 
 
-0.5 
(1.2) 
Pre crisis per 
capita income 
-0.7*** 
(4.5) 
-0.8*** 
(-5.8) 
-0.4 
(-0.2) 
-0.2** 
(2.1) 
-0.5*** 
(3.6) 
Openness -1.0 
(-1.3) 
-1.2 
(-1.3) 
-0.0 
(-0.0) 
1.7 
(0.9) 
-1.2 
(-1.5) 
Constant 24.5*** 
(3.1) 
18.5** 
(2.4) 
17.6 
(1.4) 
21.9 
(1.7) 
35*** 
(3.8) 
R2 0.71 0.66 0.78 0.70 0.56 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.50 
F 28.6*** 29.2*** 11.0*** 11.3 *** 9.1*** 
Notes: (t- values in brackets) * 90% ** 95% *** 99% significance levels 
                                                 
23 The only difference is the significance level of polity in the 1930s which is highly 
significant in the multiplicative model. 
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TABLE 3 
 Determinants of import collapse 1930s and 2008-10 (Multiplicative model, OLS, White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) 
Multiplicative Full sample 1930 2008-09 
Number of 
observations 64 66 22 24 42 
GDP decline 0.2***
(3.9)
0.2*** 
(5.0) 
0.3*** 
(3.0) 
0.3*** 
(4.5) 
0.1* 
(2.0) 
Manufacturing 
import share 
0.5**
(2.7)
0.4** 
(2.2) 
0.6** 
(2.4) 
0.6** 
(2.3) 
0.4 
(1.4) 
Pre crisis Polity 
(transformation24) 
-0.1*
(1.9)
 
 
-0.3*** 
(-3.6) 
 
 
-0.2* 
(-1.8) 
Pre crisis per 
capita income 
-0.3***
(-5.6)
-0.3*** 
(-7.5) 
-0.1 
(-0.4) 
-0.2* 
(-1.7) 
-0.3*** 
(-4.4) 
Openness -0.1
(0.8)
-0.1 
(-0.9) 
-0.0 
(-0.4) 
-0.1 
(-0.8) 
-0.1 
(1.1) 
Constant 3.9***
(4.0)
3.7*** 
(3.6) 
1.7 
(1.2) 
2.1 
(1.4) 
5.5*** 
(4.2) 
R2 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.55 0.57 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.61 0.54 0.46 0.51 
F 21.0*** 26.0*** 5.9*** 5.8*** 9.4*** 
Notes: (t- values in brackets) * 90% ** 95% *** 99% significance levels 
The first two columns of Tables 2 and 3 show the results for the full sample; 
the second column does not include pre-crisis Polity as an explanatory variable 
in order to take two colonies (India and Indonesia) on board for which no data 
are available. The third and fourth columns deal with observations for the 
1930s and follow the same procedure regarding Polity. The final column 
summarizes the findings for 2008-09. The full sample model performs quite 
well in statistical terms and explains 63 to 71 per cent of the variance. The 
coefficients for GDP decline, manufacturing import share and pre-crisis trade 
have the a priori expected signs and are highly significant at the 95 per cent 
confidence level and better. Note, however, that the coefficient for GDP 
decline is not in agreement with the idea of a trade multiplier as it is less than 1. 
Openness is not significant (as are the country size indictors that were never 
significant in any regression and have thus been excluded). Pre-crisis per capita 
income has a negative and highly significant coefficient. 
All in all the linear and the multiplicative model provide a reasonable good 
description of the two trade collapses. Comparing the full sample regressions 
and the regressions for the 1930s, we observe that the signs always agree, but 
notable differences occur with respect to the significance level of the estimated 
coefficients for pre-crisis Polity and pre-crisis per capita income in the linear 
model. The linear and multiplicative models contradict each other with respect 
to the explanatory power in the 1930s that approaches 78 per cent in Table 2, 
but deteriorates to 55 per cent in Table 3. For 2008-09 (last column) the signs 
                                                 
24 In order to be able to take logs an arbitrary constant was added so that the scale 
became strictly positive. 
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of the coefficients also agree with the general model but typically their 
significance levels deteriorate (with the exception of per capita income and – in 
the multiplicative model – pre-crisis Polity).  
The findings in the first place suggest that the mainstream narrative for a 
world trade collapse provides a reasonably good explanation of the drivers of 
the phenomenon in general, but also offer indications that the two collapses 
differ with respect to the importance of the demand shock and the 
composition effect. It is not likely that these findings are caused by 
measurement errors and differences in definitions, as the conclusions are based 
on independent cross section regressions for the 1930s and 2008-09. 
 
TABLE 4 
 Determinants of import collapse 1930s and 2008-10 (Shift and slope dummies, OLS, 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Number of 
observations 64 66 64 64 66 66 
GDP decline 0.7*** 
(4.5) 
0.7*** 
(4.3) 
0.6*** 
(3.6) 
0.2 
(0.9) 
0.3* 
(1.9) 
0.6*** 
(3.3) 
GDP decline * 
dummy 1930s 
  
 
 0.6*** 
(2.8) 
0.6*** 
(2.9) 
0.3 
(1.2) 
Manufacturing 
import share 
0.4*** 
(3.3) 
0.4*** 
(3.4) 
0.4*** 
(3.7) 
0.1 
(0.4) 
0.0 
(0.3) 
-0.1 
(-0.5) 
Manufacturing 
import share * 
dummy 1930s 
  
 
 0.4** 
(1.9) 
0.4** 
(2.1) 
0.5** 
(2.4) 
Pre crisis Polity -0.8*** 
(-2.8) 
 
 
-0.8*** 
(-2.8) 
-0.8*** 
(-2.7) 
  
 
Pre crisis per 
capita income 
 
 
-0.4** 
(-2.4) 
-0.4** 
(-2.3) 
-0.5*** 
(-3.6) 
-0.6*** 
(-3.9) 
 
 
Openness -2.9*** 
(-3.5) 
-2.1** 
(-2.1) 
-1.9** 
(-2.5) 
-1.3* 
(-1.9) 
-1.5 
(-1.5) 
 
 
Dummy 1930s 14.3*** 
(4.5) 
10.4** 
(2.6) 
8.6** 
(2.4) 
-20.1* 
(-1.8) 
-19.5* 
(-1.7) 
-18 
(-1.2) 
Constant 9.5 
(1.2) 
8.7 
(1.1) 
14.3* 
(1.7) 
37.6*** 
(4.0) 
31.7*** 
(3.8) 
24.7** 
(2.1) 
R2 0.73 0.70 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.66 
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.71 0.63 
F 30.8*** 28.4*** 28.4*** 26.4*** 24.2*** 23.6*** 
Notes: (t- values in brackets) *  90% ** 95% *** 99% significance levels 
Table 4 uses the information of the full sample but incorporates an 
additive shift dummy for the 1930s as well as multiplicative dummies that test 
for differences in the slopes of GDP decline and manufacturing import share.  
The first three columns only use the additive dummy for specifications 
that include and exclude pre-crisis polity and pre-crisis per capita income. The 
significant dummy variable reflects either that the trade decline was larger in 
the 1930s or measurement issues. In comparison to Tables 2 and 3 the 
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significance of all coefficients improves (in particular openness is now 
significant) as well as the explanatory power of the equation (as illustrated by 
the adjusted-R2). Typically the results thus support the assessment that this 
simple quasi-reduced form equation provides a reasonably good description of 
the phenomenon of trade collapse.  
The last three columns include both shift and slope dummies. Column 4 is 
the full sample model that includes all explanatory variables, column 5 excludes 
Polity (and thus additionally covers India and Indonesia in the 1930s) and 
column 6 is a version of the model that excludes all country-specific control 
variables. The estimates agree that the manufacturing import share in the 1930s 
was a much stronger factor than the average or full sample effect and thus a 
fortiori than in 2008-10. The same can be concluded on the basis of columns 4 
and 5 with respect to GDP decline but not on the basis of the model that 
excludes all country-specific control variables.   
4.3 Sensitivity analysis and robustness of the findings   
As a first issue this paper considered in the previous section the functional 
form of the estimated reduced form equation. All specifications of the 
equations were estimated both in linear and log-linear form. The results of 
these exercises are comparable in terms of both the explanatory power of the 
equation and the signs of the estimated coefficients. The significance levels 
differ, but the crucial tests on the sign and size of the coefficients for GDP 
decline and the size of the manufacturing share in imports yield comparable 
results. Importantly, the changes in the sample size and country coverage, the 
pooling of the data and the use of different specifications do not change the 
main conclusions of this paper. 
Table 5 provides yet another sensitivity analysis that sheds further light on 
the robustness of the findings. I reduce the period of observation in the 
interbellum to 1929-1932, because it can be sensibly argued that the policy 
environment in the 1930s changed dramatically after 1932 when protectionism 
did become important and countries differed dramatically in the key policy 
decisions (in particular regarding the adherence to the Gold Standard, 
Eichengreen and Irwin 2009). The cost of the reduced observation period is 
that we do not consider the full peak to trough movement; the benefit is that 
the data are probably better comparable. 
The results in Table 5 overall confirm the earlier findings for the linear 
specifications reported in Tables 2 and 4.25 I find smaller values for (adj.-)R2, 
but the explanatory power of the estimated equations remains good. The shift 
dummy variable for the 1930s becomes insignificant in columns 3 and 4. This 
suggests that the data are better comparable due to the absence of policy 
responses after 1932 (the increased size and significance of openness also point 
into that direction). However, this may also simply reflect that we do not 
analyse the full peak to trough movement so that the values for the dependent 
variable are smaller by definition. For the same reason the interpretation of the 
shift dummy for the 1930s and the constant term in columns 5 and 6 is not 
                                                 
25 For the log-linear specifications the differences are that Polity and Openness now 
become significant in the full sample at well, but only at the 90% confidence level. 
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straight-forward. Importantly, the crucial tests on the sign and size of GDP 
decline and the size of the manufacturing share in imports become even more 
convincing in this sensitivity analysis. 
TABLE 5 
 Sensitivity analysis: import collapse 1929-1932 and 2008-10 (Shift and slope 
dummies, OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Number of 
observations 64 66 64 66 64 66 
GDP decline 0.7*** 
(3.5) 
0.9*** 
(4.3) 
0.7*** 
(3.8) 
0.8*** 
(4.6) 
0.2 
(1.1) 
0.3* 
(1.9) 
GDP decline * 
dummy 1930s 
    0.7*** 
(3.2) 
0.8*** 
(3.7) 
                0.4*** 
(4.0) 
0.4*** 
(3.9) 
0.5*** 
(4.6) 
0.4*** 
(4.1) 
0.1 
(0.5) 
0.0 
(0.3) 
Manufacturing 
import share * 
dummy 1930s 
    0.5*** 
(2.6) 
0.4*** 
(2.6) 
Pre crisis Polity -0.7** 
(-2.0) 
 -0.7** 
(-2.1) 
 -0.7** 
(-2.3) 
 
Pre crisis per 
capita income 
-0.6*** 
(-3.7) 
-0.6*** 
(-3.7) 
-0.4** 
(-2.0) 
-0.4** 
(-2.0) 
-0.6*** 
(-3.5) 
-0.6*** 
(-3.9) 
Openness -1.8** 
(-2.1) 
-1.8* 
(-1.8) 
-2.5** 
(-2.6) 
-2.3** 
(-2.1) 
-1.7** 
(-2.1) 
-1.6 
(-1.5) 
Dummy 1930s   6.4 
(1.4) 
-5.7 
(-1.2) 
-31.6*** 
(-2.9) 
-30.3*** 
(-2.9) 
Constant 13.5* 
(1.7) 
9.2 
(1.4) 
6.8 
(0.8) 
3.8 
(0.5) 
36.2*** 
(4.0) 
31.6*** 
(3.8) 
R2 0.68 0.63 0.70 0.65 0.76 0.71 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.73 0.68 
F 24.8*** 26.1*** 21.8*** 26.4*** 22.0*** 20.4*** 
Notes: (t- values in brackets) * 90% ** 95% *** 99% significance levels 
5 Conclusions and implications 
In order to put the mainstream narrative for the recent world trade collapse 
into a consistent economic-historic framework, this paper developed a 
comparable data set for the analysis of the two world trade collapses of the 
1930s and the 2000s.  The empirical analysis explains about 70% of cross-
country variance in 72 periods of import decline (27 in the 1930s; 45 in the 
2000s). The findings support the emerging professional consensus: the 
decrease in domestic demand and the share of manufacturing trade are key 
determinants of the severity of a world trade collapse.  
In addition, the paper identifies other country-specific characteristics that 
impact on trade decline, including the level of development and the political 
system, that have not yet been considered in the mainstream narrative for the 
recent world trade collapse. Some evidence exists that openness is also 
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relevant, but here the evidence is only provided by the full sample estimates 
that include an additive shift dummy for the 1930s and never by the estimates 
for separate periods.  
Importantly, the analysis shows important relative differences between the 
1930s and the 2000s. Both the demand shock and the composition effect are 
comparatively speaking less important in the recent trade collapse than in the 
1930s. This is a remarkable and exciting finding given the profession’s early 
and outspoken conviction that supply chains were a (if not the) driver of the 
extraordinary trade developments in late 2008 and early 2009. The correlation 
between international value chain activity and globalization in the period 
before the trade collapse (that constitutes the basis for the main stream 
narrative on the impact of value chain activity on openness and international 
trade) may be genuine but in view of this paper’s findings requires a different 
interpretation. Globalization is a firm driven process and fragmentation of 
production according to the available evidence has been associated with an 
increase in the world’s trade-to-GDP-ratio. The underlying mechanism may, 
however, be quite different from the purely mechanical statistical relationship 
that relates to the different modes of measurement regarding GDP (value 
added) and trade (turn-over). Value chain interaction may bread trust amongst 
participating firms because of the repeated-buy character of the transactions 
and/or have external effects (such as demonstration effects, learning effects or 
network effects) which support globalization. If this is the case, there is no 
reason why this role should be asymmetrical (positive in upswings and negative 
in downturns) as assumed by the dominant narrative. This has important 
implications both for the analysis and for policy advice, in particular the idea of 
stabilizing economies by means or a reorientation towards domestic 
production. In contrast my findings imply that additional efforts are in order to 
increase trust in the trading system in particular by a firm commitment to the 
multilateral approach. 
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Appendix - Dataset 
TABLE A1 
 Data set 
 Key economic variables   Polity   Control variables 
Country Import 
decline 
GDP 
de-
cline 
Manufac-
turing 
trade  
share 
democ autoc per 
capita 
GDP 
World 
trade 
share 
GDP 
share
Popula-
tion 
share 
1930s 
Argentina 53.2 13.7 74.5 4 2 4291 2.3 1.3 0.5 
* 
Australia 57.1 17.3 74.3 10 0 5452 2.0 0.9 0.3 
* 
Austria 51.3 22.5 40.9 8 0 3657 1.3 0.7 0.3 
* 
Brazil 63.8 8.1 62.5 1 4 1158 1.3 1.0 1.5 
* 
Canada 55.6 29.6 56.6 10 0 5172 3.7 1.4 0.5 
* 
Chile 81.5 44.1 71.9 1 3 3332 0.4 0.4 0.2 
* 
China 50.5 8.7 49.9 1 6 562 2.5 7.5 23.3 
* 
Colombia 63.1 1.5 n/a 1 6 1490 0.4 0.3 0.4 
* 
Cuba 64.6 36.5 50.1 4 3 1638 0.6 0.2 0.2 
* 
Denmark 30.2 2.6 40.5 10 0 4785 1.3 0.5 0.2 
* 
Finland 43.1 4.0 53.0 10 0 2707 0.6 0.3 0.2 
* 
France 28.3 14.7 22.8 9 0 4431 6.1 5.0 2.0 
* 
Germany 41.3 16.1 24.2 6 0 4090 9.6 7.3 3.1 
* 
India 36.1 0.7 73.5 n/a n/a 706 2.6 6.4 15.8 
* 
Indonesia 47.5 9.2 69.0 n/a n/a 1130 1.2 1.9 2.9 
* 
Italy 51.8 5.5 28.7 0 9 3016 3.3 3.3 1.9 
* 
Japan 12.7 7.3 31.6 5 4 1992 2.9 3.4 3.0 
* 
Mexico 61.1 30.9 71.8 1 4 1857 0.5 0.9 0.8 
* 
Netherlands 22.2 9.5 42.9 10 0 5720 3.1 1.2 0.4 
* 
New Zea-
land 41.8 14.6 72.4 10 0 5141 0.6 0.2 0.1 
* 
Norway 23.7 7.8 50.9 10 0 3106 0.8 0.2 0.1 
* 
South Africa 38.6 n/a 77.4 7 3 n/a 1.1 n/a 0.0 
* 
Sweden 22.6 4.1 47.8 10 0 3885 1.3 0.7 0.3 
* 
Switzerland 20.4 8.0 47.4 10 0 6171 1.5 0.7 0.2 
* 
Taiwan 14.2 2.7 n/a n/a n/a 1100 0.3 0.1 0.2 
* 
UK 11.1 5.8 25.5 10 0 5357 15.1 6.7 2.2 
* 
USA 39.7 28.5 34.3 10 0 6569 11.8 22.0 5.8 
* 
Argentina 41.1 9.9 68.1 8 0 10995 0.3 0.9 0.6  
Australia 15.0 0.8 62.4 10 0 25301 1.2 1.0 0.3  
Austria 15.3 4.6 64.6 10 0 24131 1.1 0.4 0.1  
Belarus 28.6 23.7 41.1 0 7 12607 0.2 0.2 0.1  
Belgium 15.6 4.2 49.2 8 0 23655 2.9 0.5 0.2  
Brazil 33.6 9.2 53.0 8 0 6429 0.9 2.5 2.9  
Bulgaria 42.2 23.2 55.9 9 0 8886 0.2 0.1 0.1  
Canada 19.9 3.4 65.2 10 0 25267 2.9 1.7 0.5  
Chile 21.7 4.0 51.3 10 0 13185 0.3 0.4 0.2  
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TABLE A1 
 continued     
Country Import 
decline 
GDP 
de-
cline 
Manufac-
turing 
trade  
share 
democ autoc per 
capita 
GDP
World 
trade 
share 
GDP 
share
Popula-
tion 
share 
1930s 
          
Czech 
Republic 17.5 4.9 74.2 8 0 12868 0.8 0.3 0.2  
Denmark 16.8 7.0 65.6 10 0 24621 0.7 0.3 0.1  
Ecuador 18.0 n/a 52.8 5 0 3987 0.1 0.1 0.2  
Finland 26.0 9.5 55.4 10 0 24344 0.6 0.3 0.1  
France 13.7 3.9 59.9 9 0 22223 4.4 2.8 1.0  
Germany 14.4 6.7 55.5 10 0 20801 7.4 3.4 1.2  
Greece 19.5 3.2 56.6 10 0 16362 0.5 0.3 0.2  
Hungary 22.6 8.0 69.4 10 0 9500 0.7 0.2 0.1  
India 40.7 7.4 38.9 9 0 2975 1.6 6.7 17.1  
Indonesia 15.9 14.2 51.5 8 0 4428 0.5 2.0 3.4  
Ireland 21.0 1.2 56.2 10 0 27898 0.6 0.2 0.1  
Israel 20.2 6.8 65.3 10 0 17937 0.4 0.3 0.1  
Italy 20.8 8.5 52.6 10 0 19909 3.6 2.3 0.9  
Japan 20.2 4.6 46.7 10 0 22816 4.3 5.7 1.9  
Korea 
South 14.8 8.7 52.4 8 0 19614 2.5 1.9 0.7  
Malaysia 28.0 10.9 59.9 6 0 10292 1.0 0.5 0.4  
Mexico 27.9 9.1 67.7 8 0 7979 2.2 1.7 1.6  
Netherlands 11.3 5.0 50.9 10 0 24695 3.5 0.8 0.2  
New Zea-
land 22.3 2.7 58.0 10 0 18653 0.2 0.2 0.1  
Norway 14.1 2.3 71.0 10 0 28500 0.6 0.3 0.1  
Pakistan 22.9 n/a 33.8 5 0 2239 0.3 0.8 2.6  
Peru 38.1 9.6 51.3 9 0 5388 0.2 0.3 0.4  
Poland 18.6 0.3 64.5 10 0 10160 1.2 0.8 0.6  
Portugal 16.5 3.9 56.9 10 0 14436 0.5 0.3 0.2  
Romania 34.9 41.6 65.0 9 0 4895 0.5 0.2 0.3  
Russia 37.4 10.8 68.5 5 1 9111 1.4 2.5 2.1  
Singapore 24.3 9.6 67.4 2 4 28107 1.8 0.3 0.1  
South Africa 37.0 2.8 52.7 9 0 4793 0.7 0.5 0.7  
Spain 24.6 4.7 61.0 10 0 19706 2.7 1.6 0.6  
Sweden 18.0 7.7 60.5 10 0 24409 1.1 0.4 0.1  
Switzerland 11.2 2.5 63.0 10 0 25104 1.1 0.4 0.1  
Thailand 42.2 9.9 62.5 5 1 8750 1.0 1.1 1.0  
Turkey 30.7 12.8 49.1 8 1 8066 1.2 1.2 1.1  
United 
Kingdom 17.5 6.4 59.4 10 0 23742 4.4 2.8 0.9  
United 
States 20.3 4.1 59.2 10 0 31178 14.1 18.6 4.5  
Venezuela 45.6 n/a 56.2 5 0 10596 0.3 0.6 0.4  
 
